the language adopted (for a general introduction see Simons, 2000, and Burkhardt et al., 2009 ). Since we intend to consider Lewis' reconstruction of set theory with mereology, we will utilize his formulation, which is suited to the relevant aspects of the problem we are analyzing. Lewis treats mereology in a plural language, a language extending that of first-order logic, including singular and plural reference and singular and plural quantification (for a modified proposal of megethology see Martino, 1996) . Plural quantification is a reinterpretation of the second-order monadic logic proposed by Boolos (1984 Boolos ( , 1985 . In Boolos' perspective second-order monadic logic is ontologically innocent. Contrary to the most accredited view, it does not entail any commitment to classes or to properties but only to individuals, as first-order logic does. According to Boolos' interpretation, secondorder quantification differs from first-order only in that it refers to individuals plurally, while the latter refers to individuals singularly.
By combining mereology with plural quantification, Lewis introduces megethology, a powerful framework in which one can formulate strong assumptions about the size of the universe of individuals (corresponding to the existence of strongly inaccessible cardinals). Within this framework, Lewis develops a structuralist class theory, in which the role of classes is played by certain fusions of atoms and the membership relation is defined in mereological terms.
Lewis' megethology can be formalized into a first-order language with identity with two sorts of variables:
Singular variables: x, y. . . Plural variables: X, Y. . .
We introduce the primitive nonlogical constants:
≤: x ≤ y is to be read "x is part of y"; η : xηX is to be read "x is one of Xs."
We define:
X Y (the sum of the Xs and the Ys) is the plurality Z such that ∀x(xηZ ↔xηX ∨ xηY );
y is a sum of the Xs, in symbols σ X, if d f each of the Xs is a part of y and each part of y overlaps one of the Xs. Formally:
π X (the product of the Xs) is the fusion of all common parts of all the Xs, provided there is at least one part common to all the Xs.
We will first introduce the axioms for mereology: AXIOM 2.1. ≤ is a partial order (reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive it follows immediately that the universe of atoms is uncountable. Although the foregoing axioms are expressible in the language of mereology and pluralities, they are not concerned with either in the sense that they are extraneous to the characterization of both mereology and pluralities. Therefore, they fail to bring to light how the combination of mereology and pluralities affects the concept of the infinite. Of course, such a combination fails to guarantee the existence of infinitely many individuals. However, we want to show that, under the assumption of an infinity of individuals, mereology, with or without atoms, and plural quantification are able to guarantee the existence of an uncountable infinity of individuals.
We begin by presenting an informal exposition of the argument based on the intuitive notion of infinite, in particular of the countable infinite. Subsequently, we will bring forward the axioms of mereology and plural quantification that are suitable for the formalization. Proof. Suppose there are infinitely many individuals. We distinguish two cases: Case 1) Every individual has an atomic part. Since every individual is the fusion of its atoms, there are are infinitely many atoms, which are obviously pairwise nonoverlapping.
Case 2) Some individuals have no atomic part. Let x be such an individual. Then there is a countable infinity of individuals x 0 , x 1 . . . , x n . . . where x 0 = x and, for all n ∈ N, x n+1 is a proper part of x n . The relative complements, x 0 -x 1 ,. . . x n -x n+1 ,. . . , are pairwise nonoverlapping. Proof. Suppose, by reduction, that there are only countably many Ys: y 0 , y 1 . . . , y n . . . . Let y be the fusion of x 0 and all x n that are not part of y n-1 (for n > 1). Since, for all n, x n+1 is a part of y iff it is not part of y n , it follows that, for all n, y = y n .
It follows that, provided there are infinitely many individuals, there are uncountably many individuals.
We want to show that our argument rests on very intuitive axioms of mereology and plural quantification. To the purpose we will reformulate the axioms and definitions of MPQ, as well as the definition of infinite, as follows. AXIOM 3.3. ≤ is a weak partial order (reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive) .
AXIOM 3.4. For any plurality X of individuals, there is a unique individual x such that each individual overlaps x iff it overlaps at least one of the Xs. x is the sum (or fusion) of the Xs, in symbols x
The sum of two individuals x, y will be indicated by x + y.
COROLLARY 3.5. If x is a proper part of y, then some part of y does not overlap x.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that every part of y overlaps x. Then both x and y are the sum of the plurality formed by x alone, against the uniqueness of the sum. 
THEOREM 3.7. σ X is the least upper bound of the Xs, that is, for all y, σ X is part of y iff each of the Xs is part of y.
Proof. Suppose that each of the Xs is part of y. Assume, by reduction, that σ X is not part of y. Since y overlaps all Xs, σ X overlaps y. So y · σ X is a proper part of σ X and, by Corollary 3.5, there is a part z of σ X that does not overlap y · σ X , whence it does not overlap y. However, since z overlaps σ X, it must overlap one of the Xs, which is absurd because the Xs are parts of y. So σ X is part of y.
Vice versa let σ X be a part of y. Suppose, by reduction, that some x is such that xηX and x y . By Corollary 3.5 there is a z ≤ x nonoverlapping y; but this is absurd, because z must overlap σ X which is part of y. Proof. Suppose that x overlaps y. x · y is a proper part of y. So there is some part of y which does not overlap x · y. Let z be the the sum of all the parts of y nonoverlapping x · y. So z is a part of y which does not overlap x · y. Suppose, by reduction, that x · y + z is a proper part of y. Then there is a part u of y which does not overlap x · y + z and therefore does not overlap x · y. By construction of z, u overlaps z, so u overlaps x · y + z, contradiction Besides, we will exploit the crucial axiom of pluralities, the comprehension principle: AXIOM 3.9 (COMPREHENSION PRINCIPLE). The individuals satisfying any formula of the formal language (satisfied by at least one individual) form a plurality.
We do not assume the notion of ordered pair as primitive in order to mereologically reproduce the notion of function. Instead, we will define a restricted notion of ordered pair, suitable for our purposes, in mereological terms, without introducing any axiom ad hoc. Proof. Suppose x + y = x + y . We want to show that x ≤ x. Assume, by reduction, that x x. Let z = x − x. So, x = x · x + z. Since z ≤ x + y = x + y, z must overlap x or y; but it cannot overlap x because z is the relative complement of x in x and it cannot overlap y because x does not overlap y. This is absurd. So, x ≤ x. Similarly x ≤ x , whence x = x . Analogously y = y . Let X be an infinite plurality of pairwise nonoverlapping individuals and let Y , Z , U , f , g be as above. Keeping the meaning of these symbols fixed, we will construct a mereological model of the sets of Ys.
DEFINITION 3.15. A relation between two separate pluralities X, Y is any plurality R of X-Y-pairs. A function from X to Y is a relation satisfying the usual conditions of uniqueness. If f is a function from X to Y, we use the familiar notation f(x) to indicate the unique y such that (x + y)η f . We define injections, surjections, and bijections with the usual restrictions.

DEFINITION 3.16. Let X, Y be separate pluralities. The size of X is identical to the size of Y if there is a bijection of X to Y. The size of X is smaller than that of Y if there is an injection but no bijection of X to Y.
Let jη(Z − U ) be an arbitrary fixed individual. Take as a set j alone or the sum of j with some of the Ys. If α is a set and yηY , y is a member of α, in symbols y ∈ α, if d f. y ≤ α. Thus, j is the empty set ∅ and j + y is the singleton {y} of y.
EXTENSIONALITY 3.19. If two sets α and β have the same members, they are identical.
Proof. Suppose that α and β have the same members. Since α is the sum of j and (possibly) some of the Ys and these are parts of β, it follows that α ≤ β. Likewise β ≤ α, whence α = β. Proof. Let α be the sum of j and the Hs. Thus, anyone of the Hs is a member of α. Vice versa, if y ∈ α, then y ≤ α . Hence y overlaps j or one of the Hs. As the Ys are pairwise nonoverlapping and y = j, y must be one of the Hs.
From the comprehension principle for pluralities it follows immediately that: COROLLARY 3.21. The Ys satisfying any formula of the language form a set. UNION 3.22. For any plurality H of sets, there is a set α such that, for all yηY , y ∈ α iff it belongs to some of the Hs. α is the union of the Hs, in symbols α = ∪H .
Proof. α is the sum of j and all members of the Hs.
We will give a mereological reconstruction of Cantor's theorem. To the purpose, define the ordered pairs of Ys as follows: if y 1 , y 2 ηY , define the ordered pair (y 1 , y 2 ) as y 1 + g(y 2 ). We can assume, without loss of generality, that there is a j η(Z − U ), j = j, and extend g by putting g(j) = j . We can now extend in an obvious way the notion of ordered pair to the plurality Y* of all sums of individuals in the plurality ( j H ). So we can recover the notion of function (understood as a plurality of ordered pairs) between any two subpluralities of Y* and we can compare the sizes of such pluralities.
We can now reproduce the well-known proof of Cantor's theorem:
THEOREM 3.23.
The plurality S of all sets of Ys is larger than Y.
Proof. We will show that there is an injection but no bijection from Y to S.
(i) The plurality of ordered pairs of form (y,{y}) is the required injection.
(ii) Suppose, by way of reduction, that h is a bijection from Y onto S. Let α = {y : y / ∈ h(y)} and let aηY be such that h(a) = α. It turns out that a ∈ α iff a / ∈ α, contradiction. Therefore there can be no such bijection. Proof. By the axiom of choice, there is a plurality X of parts of a such that, for all xηX , there is a unique yηX such that y X x . Let bηX and cηX be such that c b and define Y as the least plurality satisfying the following clauses:
It is easily seen that Y is an infinite plurality of pairwise nonoverlapping parts of a. For, one can order Y as the natural numbers, taking (b − c) as 0 and (y − z) as the successor of (x − y) and argue as we did for the natural numbers. 4 From Theorems 3.23, 3.26 it follows that: THEOREM 3.27. There are uncountably many parts of any infinite individual. §4. Concluding remarks. Lewis maintains that mereology is ontologically innocent. In particular, he argues that, unlike set theoretical membership, the existence of the mereological sum of any plurality X of individuals does not commit to the existence of any new individual beyond the Xs. On the other hand, he clearly treats the sum of the Xs as an outright individual, different (in general) from all Xs. In contrast, he does not regard a plurality X as a singular individual (any talk of X as a single entity is to be understood as a mere linguistic device to talk of the Xs plurally). "Plural quantification is innocent: we have many things, we do mention one thing that is the many taken together. Mereology is innocent in a different way: we have many things, we do mention one thing that is the many taken together, but this one thing is nothing different from the many" (Lewis, 1991, p. 87) .
How can it be that this single thing is nothing different from the many? Of course, Lewis' claim, literally understood, would be contradictory. We think that it is to be understood in the sense that whoever accepts the existence of the Xs, commits oneself automatically to the existence of their sum (for a more detailed discussion of the innocence of mereology see Carrara & Martino, 2009) .
By virtue of Theorem 3.27, this entails that the acceptance of the countably infinite forces one to accept the uncountably infinite as well.
However, the history of the philosophy of mathematics seems to show that the claim that any infinite is countable can be held within a respectable conception of mathematics. Such famous advocates as Kronecker, Poincaré and Skolem, among others, have defended this claim. Besides, having recovered the notion of ordered pair for the plurality S of the sets of Ys, the continuum hypothesis CH is formulable in our language, so that the standard interpretation of the primitives of MPQ determines whether there are intermediate infinities between the countable and the continuum. The truth or falsity of CH is a typical set theoretical question that seems to transcend the frame of pure logic. 5 Thus, the alleged innocence of mereology, in particular Lewis' thesis that mereology is part of logic (see Lewis, 1991, pp. 81-82) , seems highly implausible. As already observed in Section 3, the fact that the universe cannot be countably infinite trivially follows from Lewis' axiom of infinity 2.7, according to which some infinite individual is small. But we want to stress again that Axiom 2.7, though expressed in the language of mereology with plural quantification, is an axiom neither of mereology nor of plural quantification. It is an axiom about the size of the universe that assumes that the universe is uncountable. So, even under Lewis' assumption that mereology and plural quantification are part of pure logic, using that axiom to show the existence of an uncountable infinity does not justify the conclusion that the existence of the latter is a logical consequence of the existence of a countable one. In contrast, the interest of our approach is that such conclusion can be justified by a minimal stock of basic axioms concerning only mereology and plural monadic quantification. The severe constraints of the axioms used in our deduction have been essential in order to enlighten the commitment to the infinite implicit in Lewis' alleged logic.
On the other hand, the notion of the infinite supported by MPQ is much weaker than that supported by general set theory. Mereology, unlike set theory, does not guarantee that, given any infinite, there is always a larger infinite. As we saw, mereology assures that, given any infinite plurality, there is also a countable plurality of pairwise nonoverlapping individuals, and that, given any plurality of pairwise nonoverlapping individuals, there exists a larger plurality of individuals. However, there is no evidence that these latter might be pairwise nonoverlapping, so that the reiteration of our procedure for finding a larger plurality is prevented.
This fact supplies a very intuitive solution to Cantor's paradox: the size of the universe of all individuals is larger than that of every plurality of pairwise nonoverlapping individuals. As far as we know, our axioms may be consistent with the conjecture that there are only two sizes of infinite: the countable and the continuum. 6 If so, MPQ might support an interesting conception of the infinite, intermediate between the countable and the set theoretical.
Finally, observe that the crucial axiom of sums (3.4), far from being ontologically innocent, helps to explicate the very strong ontological assumption underlying the classical 5 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this remark. 6 As observed by the referee, according to Field's nominalistic perspective, one can maintain the existence of an infinity of atoms of the cardinality of the continuum, the points of the geometrical space. We think, however, that the geometrical intuition of point is far less clear than that of the countable infinite, as shown, for instance, by Zeno's paradoxes. In fact, the structure of the geometrical space has been clarified through the set theoretical interpretation. We think, therefore, that MPQ is compatible with a conception of infinite that accepts a countable plurality of atoms but rejects geometrical points as primitive entities.
